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Few topics in economics evoke more passion than discussions about the correct way to do empirical
policy analysis.1 These discussions are sometimes framed as conicts between \structural" and
\reduced form" approaches.2 In current usage, \structural" is taken to mean parametric, explicitly
formulated, empirical economic models.
\Reduced form" has multiple and sometimes conicting meanings. One strand of the reduced
form approach uses explicit economic models to motivate and interpret empirical analyses and
approximates the economic models using simple econometric techniques. Harberger (1964), Shimer
and Werning (2008), Chetty (2009), and Einav et al. (2009) are good examples of this approach.
Chetty (2009) surveys a large literature in this tradition.
Another strand is the \program evaluation" approach surveyed in Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009). This approach focuses on \eects" dened by experiments or surrogates for experiments
as the objects of interest, and not the parameters of explicit economic models. It often leaves
implicit the economics and policy relevance of the output from its procedures. This paper compares
structural and program evaluation approaches|the contrast between the economic parameters
featured in the structural approach and the \eects" featured in the program evaluation approach.
Explicit structural models facilitate policy analysis. However, after 60 years of experience with
tting explicit structural models on a variety of data sources, empirical economists have come to
appreciate the practical diculties that arise in identifying, and precisely estimating, the parameters
of fully specied structural models that can answer a wide variety of policy questions. There
have been many demonstrations of the sensitivity of estimates of structural models to assumptions
about functional forms and distributions of unobservables. Liu (1960), Hendry (1980), Sims (1980),
and Leamer (1983) gave early warnings about the fragility of standard econometric estimates of
1See the essays in the symposium \Con out of Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 2,
Spring 2010 (Angrist and Pischke, 2010; Einav and Levin, 2010; Keane, 2010; Leamer, 2010; Nevo and Whinston,
2010; Sims, 2010; Stock, 2010).
2Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a) discuss the concept of structure and reduced form as dened by the pioneering
Cowles Commission econometricians who developed the rst rigorous framework for inference and policy analysis.
This concept received its clearest statement in a classic paper by Hurwicz (1962). A structural relationship in its
original usage is a relationship invariant to a class of policy interventions and can be used to make valid policy
forecasts for policies in that class. The explicit parametrizations used in the modern version of the \structural"
literature are intended to represent policy invariant parameters. Reduced forms are one representation of a structure
that represent endogenous variables in terms of exogenous variables. Current meanings of \structure" and \reduced
form" have changed greatly from their original meanings, but that is not the point of this essay.
1explicit economic models. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) and Pencavel (1986) summarize
structural estimates of the eects of taxes and wages on labor supply and report estimates from the
literature that are sometimes absurd. Lewis (1986) reports the sensitivity of structural estimates
of the causal eect of unionism on wages to the use of alternative methodologies and reports many
estimates that are incredibly large. An inuential paper by LaLonde (1986) is widely interpreted
as having demonstrated that standard structural estimation methods applied to non-experimental
data cannot duplicate the estimates obtained from a job training experiment.
These and other studies reported in the literature more than 20 years ago fueled the ight of
many empirical economists from structural models, even though Heckman and Hotz (1989) cau-
tioned that many applications of the structural approach by those comparing structural estimates
with experimental estimates did not perform specication tests to see if the estimated structural
models were concordant with the pre-program data. They show that when such tests are per-
formed, the surviving structural models closely match the estimates produced from the experiment
analyzed by LaLonde, ndings duplicated for other experiments (see Todd and Wolpin, 2006, At-
tanasio, Meghir, and Santiago, 2009, Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago, 2009, and the discussion in
Keane, Todd, and Wolpin, 2010).
The perceived failures of the structural methods of the 1970s and 1980s produced two dierent
methodological responses.3 One response|the \program evaluation" approach|was a retreat to
statistics, away from the use of explicit economic models either in formulating economic policy
questions or in suggesting frameworks for estimating models to answer such questions. The second
response was development of a more robust version of the structural approach.
The program evaluation approach replaces the traditional paradigm of economic policy evalua-
tion with the paradigm of the randomized controlled trial. In place of economic models of counter-
factuals, practitioners of this approach embrace a statistical model of experiments due to Neyman
(1923) and Cox (1958) that was popularized by Rubin (1974, 1978, 1986) and Holland (1986). In
this approach, the parameters of interest are dened as summaries of the outputs of experimental
interventions. This is more than just a metaphorical usage. Rubin and Holland argue that causal
3Throughout this essay, I consider methodologies that conduct primary empirical analyses. I do not discuss
calibration. Practitioners of the calibration approach use well-posed economic models but typically use estimates
of key parameters taken from the literature with all of the attendant problems that the parameters utilized are
not necessarily appropriate for the model being calibrated. For discussions of calibration, see Hansen and Heckman
(1996), Kydland and Prescott (1996), and Sims (1996).
2eects are dened only if an experiment can be performed.4 This conation of the separate tasks of
dening causality and identifying causal parameters from data is a signature feature of the program
evaluation approach. It is the consequence of the absence of clearly formulated economic models.
The probability limits of estimators, and not the parameters of well-dened economic models, are
often used to dene causal eects or policy eects.
The retreat to statistics in the program evaluation literature left a lot of economics behind. A big
loss was the abandonment of economic choice theory. Important distinctions about ex ante and ex
post outcomes and subjective and objective evaluations that are central to structural econometrics
were forgotten.
The inuence of the program evaluation approach is widespread. It is now commonplace for
many empirical economists to use the language of \treatment" and \control" to describe the com-
parisons made in empirical policy studies.
The structural response to the perceived failures of the 1970s and 1980s structural models
has focused on nonparametric identication and estimation of well-posed economic models within
which to conduct policy analyses. This line of work preserves the goals of the Cowles Commission
pioneers of the structural approach | to estimate models that can make forecasts for a range of
widely dierent policies and criteria. It is more explicit than the program evaluation approach
in articulating economic models. It embraces developments in dynamic economics, game theory,
auction theory, and the theory of mechanism design. The richness of the theoretical models (in
contrast to the intuitive \eects" promoted in the program evaluation literature) make the fruit
of this approach more intellectually interesting. It also produces estimates that cumulate across
studies.5
On the negative side of the ledger on structural estimation, the often complex computational
methods that are required to implement this approach make it less transparent. Replication and
sensitivity analyses are often more dicult in this approach than in the program evaluation ap-
proach. Economists advocating the program evaluation approach dismiss the structural approach
as overly complex and not \credible," focusing on the statistical and computational properties of
4For a recent statement of this position, see Berk, Li, and Hickman (2005).
5Matzkin (2007) provides a valuable overview of the literature. See also Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes
(2007) and Athey and Haile (2007) for developments in IO and auction theory respectively. See Abbring and Heckman
(2007) for discussion of identication of models of dynamic discrete choice and Aguirregebaria and Mira (2010) for a
survey of computational methods.
3estimators as the measure of the credibility of procedures (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2008,
2010).6
An important paper by Marschak (1953) suggests a middle ground between these two camps,
and is a motivation for the present paper. Writing in the early 1950s during the rst wave of struc-
tural econometrics, Marschak noted that for many problems of policy analysis, it is not necessary to
identify or estimate fully specied structural models|the goal of structural analysis as conceived
by the Cowles pioneers and successor generations of structural economists. Marschak's Maxim
suggests that economists should solve well-posed economic problems with minimal assumptions.
All that is required to conduct many policy analyses or to answer many well-posed economic ques-
tions are policy invariant combinations of the structural parameters that are often much easier to
identify than the individual parameters themselves and that do not require knowledge of individual
structural parameters. This approach advocates transparency and empirical robustness as does the
program evaluation approach, but it also focuses attention on answering clearly stated economic
and policy questions.
This approach is often less computationally intensive and focuses on a more limited range of
policy questions than the very large range of policy questions contemplated by the Cowles pioneers.
The computationally less demanding models, more transparent sources of identiability and the
relative ease of performing replication and sensitivity analyses give credibility to this approach. At
the same time, this approach improves on the program evaluation approach by producing estimates
that have clear economic and policy relevance.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I review the range of questions that
arise in evaluating economic policies and how the program evaluation approach and the structural
approach address them. I use the Roy model (1951) and its extensions as examples of widely-
used and prototypical structural models. In the following section, I apply Marschak's Maxim
to the analysis of the Roy model. This produces an empirical approach that simplies policy
analysis for a certain class of policies. It links the Roy model to the Local Average Treatment
(LATE) framework of Imbens and Angrist (1994). This approach facilitates the interpretation of
what LATE and extends the range of questions LATE answers. The nal section of the paper
6For brevity, in this paper my emphasis is on microeconometric approaches. There are parallel developments and
dichotomies in the macro time series and policy evaluation literatures. See Heckman (2000) for a discussion of that
literature.
4summarizes the argument.
This paper is not a position piece for or against any particular statistical methodology. It is
about the interpretability of estimates and their policy relevance. It is an exploration of how to get
the most out of the data using economics to dene the questions of interest and statistics to help
answer them.
2 The Structural Versus the Program Evaluation Approach to
Evaluating Economic Policies
Policy analysis is all about identifying counterfactual states. Counterfactual policy states are
possible outcomes in dierent hypothetical states of the world. An example is the set of outcomes
of the same persons in dierent tax regimes. Causal comparisons entail contrasts between outcomes
in alternative possible states holding factors other than the features of the policy being analyzed
the same across the contrasts. Thus the person subject to a particular policy is the same as the
person who is not, except for treatment status and, possibly, the outcome associated with treatment
status.
The concept of causality at the individual level is based on the notion of controlled variation|
variation in treatment holding other factors constant. This is Alfred Marshall's (1890) ceteris
paribus clause which has been the operational denition of causality in economics for over a cen-
tury.7 It is distinct from other notions of causality sometimes used in economics that are based on
prediction (e.g. Granger, 1969, and Sims, 1972).8
There are two distinct tasks in causal inference and policy analysis: (a) Dening counterfactuals
and (b) Identifying causal models from data. Table 1 delineates the two distinct problems.
The rst task entails the application of economic models. Models are descriptions of hypothetical
worlds obtained by varying|hypothetically |the factors determining outcomes. Models may be
motivated by empirical evidence, and they may crystalize evidence. They are, however, abstract
representations of the evidence with an internal logic of their own.
The second task is inference from data. It requires solving the identication problem including
7See Heckman (2000) for a discussion of the intellectual history of causality in economics.
8Holland (1986) makes useful distinctions among commonly used denitions of causality. Cartwright (2004)
discusses a variety of denitions of causality from a philosopher's perspective.
5Table 1: Two Distinct Tasks that Arise in the Analysis of Causal Models
Task Description Requirements
1 Dening the Set of Hypotheticals or
Counterfactuals
A Well-specied Economic Theory
2 Identifying Causal Parameters from Data Mathematical Analysis of Point or Set
Identication Joined With Estimation
and Testing Theory
solving practical problems of inference from empirical samples.9 Economists sometimes dier over
what constitutes admissible data for examining any policy question, what prior information should
be used and how the prior information should be used. There are no sharp rules to settle these
dierences.
Part of the controversy surrounding the construction of policy counterfactuals for evaluating
policies is a consequence of analysts being unclear about the two distinct tasks represented in
Table 1 and sometimes confusing them. Particular methods of estimation (e.g., randomization,
matching or instrumental variable estimation) have become associated with the denition of \causal
parameters", because issues of denition and identication are often conated.
The structural econometric approach to policy evaluation separates these two tasks and em-
phasizes the role of models in dening hypotheticals and causal eects. Some statisticians reject
the use of models in dening causality and seek an assumption-free approach to causal inference
and policy analysis (see, e.g., Tukey, 1986).
Any estimator makes assumptions (often implicit) about the behavior of the agents being ana-
lyzed. For example, the ability of a randomized controlled trial to identify parameters of interest
depends on assumptions about the behavior of the agents being subject to randomization.10 The
structural approach is explicit about these assumptions. The program evaluation approach is often
not. Some economists confuse the absence of explicit statements of assumptions with the absence
of assumptions.11
The \causal models" advocated in the program evaluation literature are motivated by the ex-
9Many econometricians, but not all, distinguish the task of identication from the task of inference. In this
distinction, identication is about recovering parameters from population data distributions, where sampling variation
is not an issue, and inference is about properties of sampling distributions.
10For example, risk-averse agents may not participate in randomized controlled trials. For discussion of this and
other examples, see Heckman (1992) and Heckman and Smith (1995).
11Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) present a catalogue of examples of this practice.
6periment as an ideal. They do not clearly specify the theoretical mechanisms determining the set of
possible counterfactual outcomes, how hypothetical counterfactuals are realized or how hypothetical
interventions are implemented except to compare \randomized" with \nonrandomized" interven-
tions. They focus on outcomes, leaving the model for selecting outcomes and the preferences of
agents over expected outcomes unspecied.
The emphasis on randomization or its surrogates, like matching or instrumental variables, rules
out a variety of alternative channels of identication of policy eects from data. The emphasis on
randomization has practical consequences leading to the conation of Task 1 with Task 2 in Table 1.
Since a randomized protocol is used to dene the parameters of interest, this practice sometimes
leads to the confusion that randomization is the only way|or at least the best way|to identify
causal parameters from data.
The models in the program evaluation literature do not specify the sources of randomness
generating variability among agents, i.e., they do not specify why otherwise observationally identical
people make dierent choices. They do not distinguish what is in the agent's information set from
what is in the observing economist's information set, although the distinction is fundamental in
justifying the properties of any estimator for solving selection and evaluation problems. They do
not allow for interpersonal interactions inside and outside of markets in determining outcomes that
are at the heart of game theory, general equilibrium theory, and models of social interactions and
contagion (see,e.g., Aguirregebaria and Mira, 2010; Brown and Matzkin, 1996; Brock and Durlauf,
2001; Durlauf and Young, 2001; Manski, 1993; Tamer, 2003).
The goal of the structural econometrics literature, like the goal of all science, is to understand the
causal mechanisms producing eects so that one can use empirical versions of models to forecast the
eects of interventions never previously experienced, to calculate a variety of policy counterfactuals
and to use theory to guide choices of estimators to interpret evidence and to cumulate evidence
across studies. These activities require models for understanding \causes of eects" in contrast to
the program evaluation literature that focuses only on the \eects of causes" (Holland, 1986).
Before turning to a specic comparison of the two approaches, it is useful to review the variety
of questions that arise in policy analysis. What are the economically interesting questions? The
success or failure of any methodology hinges on how well it answers substantive policy questions.
Thus, it is helpful to have a list in front of us to examine which questions are addressed or ignored
7by dierent approaches.
2.1 Policy Evaluation Problems and Criteria of Interest
Three broad classes of policy evaluation problems arise in economics. Policy evaluation problem
one is:
P1 Evaluating the Impacts of Implemented Interventions on Outcomes Including Their Impacts on
the Well-Being of the Treated and Society at Large.
It is useful to distinguish objective or public outcomes that can in principle be measured by all
external observers from \subjective" outcomes that are the evaluations of the agents experiencing
treatment (e.g. patients) or the agents prescribing treatment (e.g., physicians). Objective outcomes
are intrinsically ex post (\after the fact") in nature. The literature on program evaluation focuses
on ex post objective outcomes.
The structural literature studies both subjective and objective outcomes. Subjective outcomes
can be ex ante (\anticipated") or ex post. The outcome of a medical trial produces both a cure rate
and the pain and suering of the patient. Ex ante anticipated pain and suering from a procedure
may be dierent from ex post realized pain and suering. A similar distinction arises in an analysis
of the returns to schooling. Monetary returns are only part of total benets which include important
elements of psychic cost.12 Ex ante evaluations of outcomes by agents may dier from their ex post
evaluations. Thus in advance of going to school, students may have expectations about rewards and
costs that dier from their realizations. Expected rewards govern responses to market incentives.
The impacts in P1 include individual level or population level counterfactuals and their valuations.
\Well-being" in P1 includes the valuations of the outcomes of interventions by the agents being
analyzed or other parties (e.g., the parents of the agent or \society" at large). They may be ex ante
or ex post, and both are of interest in evaluating policy. Regret and anticipation are important
aspects of public approval of policies.
P1 is the problem of internal validity. It is the problem of identifying the impacts of an
intervention conducted in a given environment. Solving just this problem can be a challenging task
and good answers are valuable. However, most economic policy evaluation is conducted with an
12See, e.g., Becker (1964) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005).
8eye toward the future and toward informing decisions about new policies and applications of old
policies to new environments.
There is a second problem frequently encountered in policy analysis.
P2 Forecasting the Impacts (Constructing Counterfactual States) of Interventions Implemented in
One Environment in Other Environments, Including Impacts on Well-Being.
This is the problem of external validity: taking a treatment parameter or a set of parameters
identied in one environment to another environment.13
The most ambitious problem is forecasting the eects of a new policy, never previously experi-
enced:
P3 Forecasting the Impacts of Interventions (Constructing Counterfactual States Associated with
Interventions) Never Historically Experienced, Including Their Impacts on Well-Being.
P3 is a problem that economic policy analysts have to solve daily. Structural econometrics addresses
this question. The program evaluation approach does not.
2.2 A Prototypical Economic Model for Policy Evaluation
Abstract discussions of policy evaluation problems become very tedious very fast. To be specic and
to keep the discussion focused, consider the following version of the Roy model, which is a useful
framework for policy evaluation.14 The Roy model and its extensions undergird a huge literature
in microeconometrics.15 It was applications of the Roy model that fueled the ight from structural
econometrics in the 1980s.
The Roy model is a model of hypothetical outcomes. Economic theory denes the space of
possible counterfactual outcomes. It also species agent decision rules. It executes Task 1 of
Table 1.
Roy (1951) considered an economy where agents face two potential outcomes (Y0;Y1) with
distribution FY0;Y1(y0;y1) where \0" refers to the no treatment state and \1" refers to the treated
13See, e.g., Campbell and Stanley (1963), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), or Shadish, Cook, and Campbell
(2002).
14Heckman (2008) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) present general discussions of the policy evaluation problem.
15See Heckman (2001) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) for surveys. See also Vella (1998) and Keane, Todd,
and Wolpin (2010).
9state and (y0;y1) are particular values of random variables (Y0;Y1). More generally, the set of
potential outcomes is fYsgs2S where S is the set of indices of potential outcomes. In the Roy
model S = f0;1g. I focus on two outcome models to simplify the exposition. In the application
of Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974), Y0 is the value of nonmarket time, and Y1 is the value of
market time. In Willis and Rosen (1979), Y0 is the present value of high school earnings, and Y1
is the present value of college earnings. In the application of Tunali (2000), Y0 and Y1 are incomes
in two regions. The central question recognized in this literature is that analysts observe either
Y0 or Y1, but not both, for any person. In the program evaluation literature, this is called the
evaluation problem.
In addition to this problem, there is the selection problem. The values of Y0 or Y1 that are
observed are not necessarily a random sample of the potential Y0 or Y1 distributions. In the original
Roy model, an agent selects into sector 1 if Y1 > Y0. Let D be an indicator or dummy variable.
Then
D = 1(Y1 > Y0); (1)
where \1" is a function that is 1 if the condition in the argument holds and is 0 otherwise.
A variety of more general decision rules have been considered in the structural literature. A
simple generalization of the Roy model adds cost C. This can be thought of as a cost of moving
from \0" to \1", e.g., tuition in the Willis-Rosen model, costs of work in the Gronau-Heckman
model, or costs of migration in the Tunali model. The decision rule becomes
D = 1(Y1   Y0   C > 0): (2)
This framework denes a set of counterfactual outcomes and costs (Y0;Y1;C) with distribution
FY0;Y1;C(y0;y1;c) and a mechanism for selecting which element of (Y0;Y1) is observed for any person.
The outcome observed for any person, Y , can be written as
Y = DY1 + (1   D)Y0: (3)
This representation is the Quandt (1958, 1972) switching regression framework.
Agents may make their choices under imperfect information. Let I denote the agent's informa-
10tion. In advance of participation, the agent may be uncertain about all components of (Y0;Y1;C).
The expected benet is ID = E(Y1   Y0   C j I). Then
D = 1(ID > 0): (4)
Moreover, the decision maker selecting \treatment" may be dierent than the person who experi-
ences the outcomes (Y0;Y1). Thus parents may make schooling decisions for their children; doctors
may make treatment decisions for patients. More generally, decisions to participate may entail joint
approval of all parties.16
The ex post objective outcomes are (Y0;Y1). The ex ante outcomes are E(Y0 j I) and E(Y1 j I).
The ex ante subjective evaluation is ID. The ex post subjective evaluation is Y1   Y0   C. Agents
may regret their choices because realizations may dier from anticipations.
The ex ante vs. ex post distinction is essential for understanding behavior. In environments
of uncertainty, agent choices are made in terms of ex ante calculations. Yet the treatment eect
literature largely reports ex post returns. For example, the recent literature on the returns to
schooling reports ex post returns (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2005; Katz and Autor, 1999; Katz
and Murphy, 1992). Yet it is the analysis of ex ante returns that is needed to understand why, over
time, responses to increases in ex post returns to schooling have been so sluggish.17
Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2001, 2003), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006) and
Cunha and Heckman (2007) develop econometric methods for distinguishing ex ante from ex post
evaluations of social programs. Abbring and Heckman (2007) provide an extensive survey of this
literature.18
In the language of the program evaluation literature, Y1   Y0 is the individual level treatment
eect. It is also the Marshallian ceteris paribus causal eect. Because of the evaluation problem,
it is generally impossible to identify individual level treatment eects (Task 2). Even if it were
possible, Y1   Y0 does not reveal the ex ante subjective evaluation ID or the ex post assessment
Y1   Y0   C.
16See Poirier (1980) and Farber (1983).
17The econometrician may possess a dierent information set, Ie. Choice probabilities computed against one
information set are not generally the same as those computed against another information set. Operating with
hindsight, the econometrician may be privy to some information not available to agents when they make their
choices.
18Manski (2004) surveys a rich literature on the elicitation of expectations.
11Economic policies can operate through changing (Y0;Y1) or through changing C. Thus, in the
college going example, policies may reduce tuition costs or reduce commuting costs (Card, 2001).
They may tax future earnings. The structural approach considers policies aecting both returns
and costs.19
2.3 Population Parameters of Interest
Because it is generally impossible to identify individual-level treatment eects, analysts typically
seek to identify parameters dened at the population level. Conventional parameters include the
Average Treatment Eect (ATE = E(Y1   Y0)), the eect of Treatment on The Treated (TT =
E(Y1   Y0 j D = 1)), or the eect of Treatment on the Untreated (TUT = E(Y1   Y0 j D = 0)).
However, in addressing economic policy evaluation questions, a variety of other population level
parameters are often more interesting. In positive political economy, the fraction of the population
that perceives a benet from treatment is of interest. This is called the voting criterion and is
Pr(ID > 0) = Pr(E(Y1   Y0   C j I) > 0):
In gauging support for a policy in place, the percentage of the population that ex post perceives a
benet may also be of interest: Pr(Y1   Y0   C > 0).
More generally, for evaluation of the distribution of welfare, knowledge of the ex ante and ex
post joint distributions of outcomes are of interest.20 Because of the evaluation problem, it is very
dicult to identify the joint distribution because we generally do not observe Y0 and Y1 together.
This problem plagues all methodologies including social experiments.21
Determining marginal returns to a policy is a central goal of economic analysis. In the gener-
alized Roy model, the margin is specied by people who are indierent between \1" and \0", i.e.,
those for whom ID = 0. The mean eect of treatment for those at the margin of indierence is
E(Y1   Y0 j ID = 0):
19See, e.g., Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a,b,c), Duo (2004), Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2005, 2006), Albrecht,
Van den Berg, and Vroman (2009), or Lee and Wolpin (2006).
20See Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) and Abbring and Heckman (2007) for discussions of these parameters.
21See Abbring and Heckman (2007) for discussions of alternative approaches to identify or bounding these joint
distributions.
12I discuss approaches for identifying this parameter in Section 3.
2.4 Treatment Eects Versus Policy Eects
Dierent policies can aect treatment choices and outcomes dierently. Each of the population-level
treatment eects discussed in the previous subsection can be dened for dierent policy regimes.
Economists are often more interested in the eects of policies on outcomes than in conventional
treatment eects.
To illustrate this point, consider the Policy Relevant Treatment Eect (Heckman and Vytlacil,
2001c) which extends the Average Treatment Eect by accounting for voluntary participation in
programs. It is designed to address problems P2 and P3. Let \b" represent a baseline policy
(\before") and \a" represent a policy being evaluated (\after"). Let Y a be the outcome under
policy a, while Y b is the outcome under the baseline. (Y a
0 ;Y a
1 ;Ca) and (Y b
0 ;Y b
1 ;Cb) are outcomes
under the two policy regimes.
Policy invariance facilitates the job of answering problems P2 and P3. If some parameters are
invariant to policy changes, they can be safely transported to dierent policy environments. Struc-
tural econometricians search for policy invariant \deep parameters" that can be used to forecast
policy changes.22
Under one commonly invoked form of policy invariance, policies keep the potential outcomes
unchanged for each person: Y a
0 = Y b
0 , Y a
1 = Y b
1 , but aect costs (Ca 6= Cb).23 A tuition policy in
the absence of general equilibrium eects is an example. Invariance of this type rules out social
eects including peer eects and general equilibrium eects. Let Da and Db be the choice taken
under each policy regime. Invoking invariance of potential outcomes, the observed outcomes under
each policy regime are Y a = Y1Da+Y0(1 Da) and Y b = Y1Db+Y0(1 Db). The Policy Relevant
Treatment Eect (PRTE) is
PRTE = E(Y a   Y b):
This is the Benthamite comparison of aggregate outcomes under policies \a" and \b".24 PRTE
extends ATE by recognizing that policies aect incentives to participate (C) but do not force
22Frisch (1933, translated in 2009) considered these notion under the concept of \autonomy." See Marschak (1953)
and Hurwicz (1962) who develop renements of this concept.
23Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) discuss a variety of invariance assumptions.









13people to participate. Only if C is very large under b and very small under a, so there is universal
nonparticipation under b and universal participation under a, would ATE and PRTE be the same
parameter.
2.5 The Structural Approach Versus the Program Evaluation Approach
The recent literature on program evaluation in economics draws on a model of counterfactuals
and causality attributed to Donald Rubin by Paul Holland (1986).25 It denes causality using
experimental manipulations and thereby creates the impression in the minds of many followers of
this approach that random assignment is the most convincing way to identify causal models.
Neyman and Rubin postulate counterfactuals fYsgs2S.26 They do not develop choice mecha-
nisms that determine which outcome is selected or the subjective evaluations of treatments. There
is no discussion of the mechanisms producing the outcomes studied or the relationship between
outcomes and choice mechanisms.
Rubin (1986) invokes a portion of the traditional econometric invariance assumptions developed
by Hurwicz (1962).27 Since he does not develop models for choice or subjective evaluations, he does
not consider the more general invariance conditions for both objective and subjective evaluations
that are features of the structural literature.28 The range of issues covered by the two approaches
is given in Table 2.29
The Neyman-Rubin model does not consider many issues discussed in structural economet-
rics. It is at best an incomplete introduction to some of the important issues in evaluating social
policies.30 The analysis in Rubin's 1974 and 1978 papers is a dichotomy between randomization
and non-randomization, and not an explicit treatment of particular selection mechanisms in the
non-randomized case as is developed in the structural literature.
The statisticians who have had the greatest impact on the program evaluation literature in
economics conate the two tasks stated in Table 1. The discussion of Holland (1986) illustrates
25See, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
26S = f0;1g in the Roy example.
27He calls it \SUTVA" for Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption.
28See, e.g., Heckman (2008) or Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) for discussions of these conditions.
29Not every paper in the empirical structural literature addresses all of the issues in Table 2 in deriving its estimates,
but most papers in this tradition are explicit in noting which questions are not addressed.
30It is a mark of their detachment from economics that advocates of the program evaluation approach in economics
claim that Marshall's ceteris paribus concept (Marshall, 1890) for dening causality was developed in a 1974 paper
by Rubin, and that they also attribute versions of the Cowles Commission policy invariance assumptions to Rubin.
14Table 2: Comparison of the Aspects of Evaluating Social Policies that are Covered by the




Counterfactuals for objective outcomes (Y0;Y1) Yes Yes
Agent valuations of subjective outcomes (ID) No (choice-mechanism
implicit)
Yes
Models for the causes of potential outcomes No Yes
Ex ante versus ex post counterfactuals No Yes
Treatment assignment rules that recognize the vol-
untary nature of participation
No Yes
Social interactions, general equilibrium eects and
contagion
No (assumed away) Yes (modeled)
Internal validity (problem P1) Yes Yes
External validity (problem P2) No Yes
Forecasting eects of new policies (problem P3) No Yes
Distributional treatment eects Noa Yes (for the general case)
Analyze relationship between outcomes and choice
equations
No (implicit) Yes (explicit)
aAn exception is the special case of common ranks of individuals across counterfactual
states: \rank invariance." See the discussion in Abbring and Heckman (2007).
this point and the central role of the randomized controlled trial to the Holland-Rubin analysis.
After explicating the \Rubin model," Holland makes a very revealing claim: there can be no causal
eect of gender on earnings because analysts cannot randomly assign gender. This statement
confuses the act of dening a causal eect (a purely mental act performed within a model) with
empirical diculties in estimating it.31 The local average treatment eect \LATE" parameter of
Imbens and Angrist (1994), discussed in Section 3, follows in this tradition and uses instrumental
variables as surrogates for randomization. LATE is dened by an instrument and conates tasks 1
and 2 of Table 1. In Section 3, I present a framework that denes the LATE parameter within the
generalized Roy model discussed in Subsection 2.2 that separates issues of denition of parameters
from issues of identication.
31As another example of the same point, Rubin denies that it is possible to dene a causal eect of sex on intelligence
because a randomization cannot in principle be performed. \Without treatment denitions that specify actions to be
performed on experimental units, I cannot unambiguously discuss causal eects of treatments" (Rubin, 1978, p. 39).
In this and many other passages in the statistics literature, a causal eect is dened by a randomization. Issues of
denition and identication are confused. This confusion continues to ourish in the literature in applied statistics.
For example, Berk, Li, and Hickman (2005) echo Rubin and Holland by insisting that if an experiment cannot \in
principle" be performed, a causal eect cannot be dened.
152.6 Identifying Policy Parameters
The structural approach to policy evaluation addresses policy evaluation questions P1-P3 by esti-
mating models for Y0, Y1, and C in dierent economic environments. Commonly used specications
write
Y1 = 1(X) + U1; Y0 = 0(X) + U0; C = C(Z) + UC; 32 (5)
where (X;Z) are observed by the analyst, and U0;U1;UC are unobserved. Economic theory species
the ingredients in Z and X. In general, there is no \objective" way to choose these conditioning
variables. Any argument for inclusion or exclusion of variables has to be made by an appeal to
theory | implicit or explicit.
To simplify notation, I dene Z to include all of X. Variables in Z not in X are instruments.
Write ID = E(Y1   Y0   C j I) = D(Z)   V where D(Z) = E(1(X)   0(X)   C(Z) j I) and
V =  E(U1   U0   UC j I). In this notation, choice equation (3) can be expressed as
D = 1(D(Z) > V ): (6)
In the early literature that implemented this approach 0(X), 1(X), and C(Z) were assumed
to be linear in the parameters, and the unobservables were assumed to be normal and distributed
independently of X and Z.
The caricature of the structural approach in the recent program evaluation literature is that
linearity and normality are essential to this approach. In truth, the essential aspect of the structural
approach is joint modeling of outcome and choice equations. Structural econometricians have devel-
oped nonparametric identication analyses for the Roy and generalized Roy models. See Heckman
and Honor e (1990), Heckman (1990), Ahn and Powell (1993), Andrews and Schafgans (1998), and
Das, Newey, and Vella (2003). The eld has moved well beyond the parametric functional forms
used in the early papers that were the targets of the 1980's criticism. Traditional distributional and
parametric assumptions are relaxed in the recent structural econometric literature. (See Ackerberg,
Benkard, Berry, and Pakes, 2007; Athey and Haile, 2007; Matzkin, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2007, 2010a,b;
Powell, 1994; Vella, 1998; Abbring and Heckman, 2007; and Keane et al., 2010; for reviews.)
321(X) = E(Y1 j X); 0(X) = E(Y0 j X); C(Z) = E(C j Z):
16As an illustration of the benets of the structural approach for solving policy problem P3,
consider the analysis of college choice by Cameron and Taber (2004). Suppose that one seeks to
know the eects of increases in the expected gross returns to college E((Y1   Y0) j I) on college
choices. From equation (6), if one knows the eects of variations in tuition (C) on college choices,
one can use the choice outcomes associated with variations in C to accurately predict the response
to changes of equal magnitude (in opposite sign) in expected mean gross returns, even if returns to
schooling have never varied in the past.
2.7 Marschak's Maxim and the Relationship Between the Structural Economics
Literature and the Program Evaluation Literature: A Synthesis
Structural models make explicit the preferences and constraints which govern individual decisions,
the rules of interaction among agents in market and social settings, and the sources of variability
across agents. These features facilitate nding answers to policy questions P1{P3. They are absent
from the program evaluation literature.
At the same time, that literature makes fewer statistical assumptions in terms of independence,
functional form, exclusion and distributional assumptions than the standard structural estimation
literature in econometrics. This is an attractive feature of the program evaluation approach.33
The greater simplicity of its estimation schemes fosters transparency, replicability, and sensitivity
analyses.34 While the structural economics literature has advanced greatly in recent years in terms
of producing a robust version of its product, it is an unpleasant fact that fully-specied structural
models are often harder to compute. It is more dicult to replicate the estimates from them and
to test the sensitivity of estimates to assumptions.
The two approaches can be reconciled by noting that for many policy questions, it is not
necessary to identify fully specied models to answer a range of policy questions. It is often
sucient to identify policy-invariant combinations of structural parameters. These combinations
are often much easier to identify (i.e., require fewer and weaker assumptions), and do not require
knowledge of the particular individual structural parameters that form the combination.
33A recent exception to this robust approach is the analysis of Angrist and Pischke (2008) who claim that policy
evaluation models should be based on linear-in-parameter estimating equations.
34Manski (1995, 2003) has developed an elaborate methodology for sensitivity analysis in the program evaluation
literature for certain classes of data.
17Marschak (1953) recognized that the answers to many policy evaluation questions do not require
knowledge of all of the component parts of full structural models. I call this principle Marschak's
Maxim in honor of his insight. Consider estimating the marginal eect of policy expansions. The
traditional structural approach identies the component parts of E(Y1   Y0 j ID = 0) constructed
from estimates of the parameters of equations (5) and (6) and assembles them to estimate the
marginal eect of the policy expansion (see Bj orklund and Mott, 1987).
In the next section, I exposit an approach that is consistent with Marschak's Maxim that directly
identies the combination of parameters that dene E(Y1   Y0 j ID = 0) to solve policy problems,
rather than identifying the component parts of the structural model and building it up from the
components. Marschak's Maxim is an application of Occam's Razor to policy evaluation.35
3 Using Economics to Interpret What LATE Estimates and to
Make It Useful For Evaluating a Broad Range of Policies
This section presents an example of an approach to policy evaluation that implements Marschak's
Maxim in the context of LATE. It makes the implicit economics in LATE explicit and thereby
expands the range of policy questions that LATE can address.
In the economic theory of policy evaluation, a comparison between marginal benets and
marginal costs determines the optimal size of social programs. For example, to evaluate the op-
timality of a policy that promotes expansion in college attendance, analysts need to estimate the
return to college for the marginal student, and compare it to the marginal cost of the policy. This
task requires that analysts identify marginal returns.
In the spirit of the program evaluation literature, in the following discussion, I ignore general
equilibrium eects, and I do not emphasize the ex ante and ex post distinction. Both topics
are addressed in many papers in the structural approach. To simplify the notation, I keep the
conditioning variables X implicit unless it claries matters by making them explicit. I follow
standard conventions and denote random variables by capital letters and their realizations by the
corresponding lower case letters. Thus Z = z means that random variable Z takes the value z.
35Heckman and Robb (1985) apply a version of Marschak's Maxim to methods in program evaluation. Thus
matching can identify the average treatment eect or treatment on the untreated without identifying the component
parts of equations (5) and (6).





K). I assume for simplicity that all means are nite.
The equation for ex post outcome Y as a function of participation status is
Y =  + D + "; (7)
where D is a dummy variable indicating participation in a program,  is the individual return
to participation or treatment eect and " is an error term that is unobserved by the analyst.
Equation (7) is one representation of the Quandt switching regression model (3). In terms of
counterfactual notation,  = 0, " = U0 and Y0 = 0 + ", and  = (Y1   Y0) = 1   0 + U1   U0:
Estimating marginal returns to a policy that changes D is a relatively simple task if the eect
of the policy is the same for everyone (conditional on X). This is the case when U1   U0 = 0, and
" = U0 = U1. In this case, the mean marginal and average returns are the same for all people with
the same X.
The recent literature on policy evaluation allows for the possibility that  varies among people
even after conditioning on X. Denoting the mean of  by  , the outcome equation can be written
as
Y =  +  D + f" + (    )Dg; (8)
where   = 1   0.36 If  is uncorrelated with D, the only new econometric problem that arises
in the analysis of (8) that is not present in the traditional analysis of (7) is that the error term is
heteroscedastic. As in the case where  is a common parameter shared by everyone with the same
X, the main econometric problem for inference about   is that D is correlated with ".37
 is statistically independent of D if, given X, agents cannot anticipate their ex post idiosyn-
cratic gains from participation so      is independent of D because it is not in the agent's
information set I. Another reason why  might be independent of D is that agents know     ,
but do not act on it in choosing D. In both cases, mean marginal returns are the same as mean
average returns. Under standard conditions, application of instrumental variables identies  .38
36I assume that the mean is nite: Ejj < 1.
37If this problem is solved, it is possible to estimate the distribution of  (see, e.g., Heckman and Smith, 1998).
38Matching and selection methods also identify   under their assumed conditions. Regression discontinuity methods
are a local version of instrumental variables (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001, and Heckman and Vytlacil,
2007b).
19One does not have to specify the model by which D is selected. All valid instruments identify  .
The recent literature analyzes the less conventional case where agents know and make choices
about D with at least partial knowledge of  = Y1   Y0, and the agent knows more about Y1   Y0
than what is in the observing economists' conditioning set (X;Z). Instrumental variables (IV)
do not in general estimate   and instrumental variables estimators using dierent instruments
have dierent probability limits.39 Structural selection models can estimate the distribution of 
(and hence  ) and answer a range of the public policy evaluation questions discussed in Section 2
but under assumptions that are held to be \incredible" in the program evaluation literature.40
Angrist and Pischke (2008, 2010) oer the Local Average Treatment Eect (LATE) as a \credible"
alternative to structural methods.
Under the conditions reviewed in the next subsection, Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that
instrumental variable estimators identify LATE, which measures the mean gross return to treatment
for individuals induced into treatment by a change in an instrument. The LATE parameter is widely
interpreted as estimating the mean return at the margin dened by manipulation of the instrument.
In general, LATE is not the same as  , but it might be all that is needed to evaluate any
particular policy. The key question is \what question does LATE answer?" Unfortunately, the
people induced to go into state 1 (D = 1) by a change in any particular instrument need not be
the same as the people induced to go to state 1 by policy changes other than those corresponding
exactly to the variation in the instrument. A desired policy eect may not directly correspond to
the variation captured by the IV. The people induced to change state by the instrument are not
identied in LATE. Widely held intuitions about what IV identies break down in this case since
dierent instruments identify dierent parameters. Moreover, if there is a vector of instruments
that generates choices and the components of the vector are intercorrelated, IV estimates using
the components of Z as instruments, one at a time, do not, in general, identify the policy eect
corresponding to varying that instrument, keeping all other instruments xed, the ceteris paribus
eect of the change in the instrument. Recent research that builds on and improves LATE shows
how to use the generalized Roy model implicit in LATE to estimate the mean marginal returns
to alternative ways of producing marginal expansions of programs when variation in the available
39See Heckman and Robb (1985, p. 196); Heckman (1997); Heckman, Schmierer, and Urzua (2010).
40See Abbring and Heckman (2007) for a survey of methods for estimating and bounding the distribution of .
20instruments does not correspond exactly to the variation induced by proposed policies.41 This
research also enables analysts to determine the people who are aected by changes in instruments.
I rst review LATE and then consider recent extensions of it.
3.1 LATE
LATE is dened by the variation of an instrument. The instrument in LATE plays the role of a
randomized assignment. Indeed, randomized assignment is an instrument.42 Using the notation of
Section 2, Y0 and Y1 are potential ex post outcomes. Instrument Z assumes values in Z, z 2 Z.
D(z) is an indicator of hypothetical choice representing what choice the individual would have
made had the individual's Z been exogenously set to z. D(z) = 1 if the person chooses (is assigned
to) 1. D(z) = 0, otherwise. One can think of the values of z as xed by an experiment or by some
other mechanism independent of (Y0;Y1). All policies are assumed to operate through their eects
on Z. It is assumed that Z can be varied conditional on X.
Imbens and Angrist (1994) make three assumptions to dene LATE. Their rst assumption is
an instrumental variables assumption formulated in terms of a model of counterfactuals:
(IA-1) (Y0;Y1;fD(z)gz2Z) ? ? Z j X
where \? ?" denotes independence, and A ? ? B j X means A is independent of B conditional on X.
(Y1;Y0;fD(z)gz2Z) are random variables dened over the population. Assumption (IA-1) states
that the values of potential outcomes and potential choices are independent of Z (conditioning on
X).
Imbens and Angrist also assume a rank condition:
(IA-2) Pr(D = 1 j Z = z) is a nontrivial function of z conditional on X.
This says that the distribution of P(Z) = Pr(D = 1 j Z) is nondegenerate conditional on X.
To make IV identify a treatment eect, they invoke a monotonicity condition on the D(z) at
the individual level.
(IA-3) For any two values of Z, say Z = z1 and Z = z2, either D(z1)  D(z2) for all persons, or
D(z1)  D(z2) for all persons.
41See Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007a,b), Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006), and Carneiro et al. (2009,
2010)
42Heckman (1996).
21This condition is a statement across people. z1 and z2 are two dierent values of vector Z. Fixing
the instrument at two values z1 and z2 moves choices across people in the same direction (either
in favor of 1 or against it). This condition does not require that for any other two values of Z,
say z3 and z4, the direction of the inequalities on D(z3) and D(z4) have to be ordered in the same
direction as they are for D(z1) and D(z2). It only requires that the direction of the inequalities
are the same across people. Thus for any person, D(z) need not be monotonic in z.43
Under these conditions, Imbens and Angrist establish that for two distinct values of Z, z1 and
z2, IV applied to (7) identies
LATE(z2;z1) = E(Y1   Y0 j D(z2) = 1;D(z1) = 0);
if the change from z1 to z2 induces people into the program (D(z2)  D(z1)).44 This is the mean
return to participation in the program for people induced to switch treatment status by the change
from z1 to z2.45
LATE does not identify which people are induced to change their treatment status by the change
in the instrument. It also leaves unanswered many of the policy questions discussed in Section 2.
For example, if a proposed program changes the same components of vector Z as used to identify
LATE but at dierent values of Z (say z4, z3), LATE(z2,z1) does not identify LATE(z4, z3). If the
policy operates on dierent components of Z than are used to identify LATE, one cannot safely
use LATE to identify marginal returns to the policy. LATE answers a version of policy problem
P1 for objective outcomes, but ignores P2 and P3. It does not, in general, identify treatment on
the treated, ATE or the other parameters discussed in Section 2.
3.2 Making Explicit the Implicit Economics of LATE
In a fundamental paper, Vytlacil (2002) shows that the LATE model is equivalent to a nonpara-
metric version of the generalized Roy model. The Imbens-Angrist conditions imply the generalized
Roy model, and the generalized Roy model implies the LATE model. Vytlacil's analysis is the
basis for dening LATE abstractly within a well-posed economic model and separating the task of
43For this reason, Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) call this condition \uniformity."
44This expression is easily modied to cover the opposite case where the change in Z reduces program participation.
(IA-3) rules out both cases arising at the same time.
45If \monotonicity" were not invoked, changes in Z from z
1 to z
2 could induce two way ows.
22denition (Task 1 of Table 1) from the task of identication (Task 2 of Table 1). Vytlacil's analysis
claries the implicit economic assumptions of LATE, what features of the generalized Roy model
LATE estimates, and what policy questions LATE addresses. It also extends the range of policy
questions that LATE can answer.
By Vytlacil's theorem, the Imbens-Angrist conditions imply (and are implied by) a continuous
latent variable discrete choice model, which represents the individual's decision to enroll in the
program being studied. Recall that ID (in equation (4)) is the net benet to the individual of
enrolling in the program. A person takes treatment D = 1 (e.g., goes to college) if ID > 0; otherwise
D = 0. Vytlacil shows that the treatment choice equation underlying LATE can be expressed in
terms of observed (Z) and unobserved (V ) variables that can be represented by equation (6):
ID = D(Z)   V and D = 1 if ID > 0; D = 0 otherwise, where V is a continuous random variable
with distribution function FV .46 D(Z) is dened in the discussion preceding equation (6). V may
depend on U0 and U1 in a general way.47
LATE assumes that (U0;U1;V ) are independent of Z given X. This relaxes the indepen-
dence assumption (between X and the unobservables) that was frequently maintained in the early
structural literature. The counterfactual choice indicator is generated by choice equation (6):
D(z) = 1(D(z) > V ). This representation makes explicit the implicit random variable (V ) used
to dene D(z) in the analysis of Imbens and Angrist, and the independence between Z and V that
is part of condition (IA-1).
The additive separability between D(Z) and V in the latent index model (6) plays an essential
role in LATE. Model (6) is far from the most general possible representation of choices. If choice
responses to variations in Z are heterogeneous in a general way, the same change in Z could
lead some persons toward and other persons away from participation in the program, and the
separability between D(Z) and V in (6) would break down. Another way to say this is that
monotonicity condition (IA-3) would be violated.48
To understand the economic model implicit in LATE, let P(z) denote the probability of taking
treatment (e.g., attending college, D = 1) conditional on Z = z: P(z)  Pr(D = 1jZ = z). From
46Recall that I keep the X implicit, but it is implicitly conditioned on throughout this paper.
47In the original Roy model (1951) V =  (U0   U1).
48See Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) for a discussion of this case. An example is D(Z) = Z, where  varies
among people so that the same change in Z can produce dierences among people in choice responses to variations
in Z in addition to the variation produced by V .
23equation (6), P(z) = Pr(D(z) > V ) = FV (D(z)). P(z) is a monotonic transformation of the
mean utility function D(z) in discrete choice theory. P(z) is sometimes called the propensity
score.
Dene random variable UD = FV (V ), which is uniformly distributed over the interval [0;1] and
thus the pth quantile of UD is p, i.e., the proportion of UD that is p or lower. Dierent values of
UD correspond to dierent quantiles of V . We can rewrite (6) using FV (D(Z)) = P (Z) so that
D = 1(P(Z) > UD): (9)
From the estimated propensity score, one can identify the ex ante net benet ID up to scale.
Thus, one can determine for each value of Z = z, what proportion of people perceive that they will
benet from the program and the intensity of their benet. Using the nonparametric identication
analyses of Cosslett (1983), Manski (1988), Klein and Spady (1993), and Matzkin (1992, 1993, 1994,
2007), one can nonparametrically identify the distribution of V and the mean valuation D(Z) (up
to scale).49 Thus, from agent choices, one can supplement the information in LATE and ascertain
ex ante subjective evaluations.
As a consequence of Vytlacil's theorem, the LATE assumptions imply the selection model
representation (i.e., the generalized Roy model) and using the selection model representation, one
can establish that E(Y j Z = z) = E(Y j P(Z) = P(z)). Under the LATE assumptions, Z enters
the model only through its eect on P(Z). This property is called index suciency where P(Z) is
the index. It is a central property of the LATE model.
As a consequence of Vytlacil's theorem, one can dene LATE(z2;z1) using the latent variable
UD and the values taken by P(Z) when Z = z1 and Z = z2. To do so, I use the property that the
Z enter the model only through P(Z).
LATE(z2;z1) = E(Y1   Y0 j P(z1)  UD  P(z2)): (10)
This is the mean gross return to persons whose UD 2 [P(z1);P(z2)].50
49The scale is the standard deviation of V , V .
50Because UD is a continuous random variable, the distinction between strict and weak inequalities is irrelevant in
dening the expressions in section 3 of this paper.
24The LATE parameter can be dened within the generalized Roy model, without reference to
an instrument. Thus the LATE produced by economic theory can be expressed as
LATE( uD;uD) = E(Y1   Y0 j uD  UD   uD); (11)
the mean gross return to persons whose UD 2 [uD;  uD]. This is a theoretical construct (Task 1).
Proceeding in this fashion, we separate Task 1 of Table 1 from Task 2. A choice of two values of
Z (z1 and z2) picks specic values of [uD;  uD] that identify the model-generated LATE from data
(say Pr(D = 1 j Z = z1) = p1 = uD and Pr(D = 1 j Z = z2) = p2 =  uD). This is Task 2.
3.2.1 The Surplus From Treatment and the Marginal Treatment Eect
Using Vytlacil's theorem, it is possible to understand more deeply what economic questions LATE
answers. Toward that end, it is useful to introduce the Marginal Treatment Eect (MTE) and show
how it can be used to unify the literature on treatment eects and to make explicit the economic
content of LATE.
For P(Z) = p, the mean gross gain of moving from \0" to \1" for people with UD less than or
equal to p is
E(Y1   Y0 j P(Z)  UD;P(Z) = p) = E(Y1   Y0 j p  UD) = E(Y1   Y0 j D(z)  V ):51 (12)
The rst equality follows from the LATE assumption that (Y0;Y1) are independent of the instru-
ments Z (IA-1) and hence any functions of Z. The second equality follows from the denition of
the propensity score. The mean gross gain in the population (or gross surplus S(p)) that arises
from participation in the program for people whose UD is at or below p is the product of the gain
to people whose UD is at or below p and the proportion of people whose UD is at or below p:
E(Y1   Y0 j p  UD)p = S(p).
Using Vytlacil's theorem, we can move from the theory (Task 1 of Table 1) to the data (Task
2 of Table 1) to identify the gross surplus S(p). The mean of Y given P(Z) = p depends on the
51The mean net gain is E(Y1   Y0   C j p  UD).
25gross surplus:
E(Y j P(Z) = p) = E(Y0 + 1(p  UD)(Y1   Y0)) (13)




We can identify the left-hand side of (13) for all values of p in the support of P(Z).52 This is Task
2 in Table 1. It is not necessary to impose functional forms to obtain this expression, and one
can avoid one of the criticisms directed against 1980's structural econometrics. The surplus can be
dened for all values of p 2 [0;1] whether or not the model is identied.
If p is increased by a small change in z, some people near the margin of indierence who chose
not to participate in the program would now choose to participate. Small variations in p identify
the mean marginal gross return to a policy expansion that changes P(Z). Formally, the marginal
increment in outcomes is
@E(Y j P(Z) = p)
@p




This is the mean marginal gross return to treatment for persons indierent between participation in
the program or not at mean scale utility level p = UD, and it is also the marginal change in the gross
surplus. The sample analogue of (14) is the local instrumental variable (LIV) estimator of Heckman
and Vytlacil (1999, 2005).54 Adopting a nonparametric approach to estimating E(Y j P(Z) = p)
avoids extrapolation outside of the sample support of P(Z) and produces a data sensitive structural
analysis.
A generalization of this parameter dened for other points of evaluation of uD is the Marginal
Treatment Eect (MTE):
MTE(uD)  E(Y1   Y0 j UD = uD):
52The support of a random variable is the region where it has positive density.
53For any two random variables M, N with density f(m;n) where m and n are realizations of M and N, where















fN(n)dn = r, where fN(n) = 1. Thus
@[E(Mjr>N) Pr(r>N)]
@r = E(M j N =
r). In the expression in the text, M = Y1   Y0 and N = UD.
54Chalak, Schennach, and White (2010) develop the sampling properties of this estimator under general conditions.
26Figure 1: Plots of E(Y jP(Z) = p) and the MTE derived from E(Y jP(Z) = p)



















(a) Plot of the E(Y jP(Z) = p















(b) Plot of MTE(uD): The derivative of
E(Y j P(Z) = p) evaluated at points p = uD
Source: Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
This parameter is very useful in understanding how to go from IV estimates to policy eects and in
interpreting the economics of LATE.55 Recall that UD is a uniform random variable in the interval
[0;1], so that MTE for dierent uD values shows how the mean gross returns to the program vary
with dierent quantiles of the unobserved component of the utility of participation, UD.
Expression (13) can be simplied to












@p = MTE(p). Figure 1 plots E(Y j P(Z) = p) (Fig-
ure 1(a)) and its derivative (Figure 1(b)) using values derived from a model discussed in Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005). In this analysis, E(Y j P(Z) = p) increases at a diminishing rate in p, so
MTE(uD) is decreasing in uD, i.e., there are diminishing returns to the marginal entrants attracted
into the program by increasing P(z).
Notice from (14) that persons with larger values of P(z) identify the return for those with larger
values of UD, i.e., values of UD that make persons less likely to participate in the program. This
is so because marginal increases in P(z) at high levels of P(z) induce those individuals with high
55MTE was introduced into the literature on policy evaluation by Bj orklund and Mott (1987) and extended in
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001b, 2005, 2007b).
27UD values into treatment. This is a consequence of the economic choice model (9). Those with low
values of UD already participate in the program for low values of P(z) = p. A marginal increase in
P(z) starting from a high value has no eect on the participation decision of those with low values
of UD. From LIV, it is possible to identify returns at all quantiles of UD within the support of
the distribution of P(Z) to determine which persons (identied by the quantile of the unobserved
component of the desire to take the treatment, UD) are induced to go into the treatment (D = 1)
by a marginal change in P(z), i.e., analysts can dene the margins of choice traced out by variations
in dierent instruments as they shift P(z). This claries what empirical versions of LATE identify
by showing that all instruments operate through P(z), and variations around dierent levels of
P(z) identify dierent stretches of the MTE. I now develop this point.
3.2.2 The Fundamental Role of the Choice Probability in Understanding What In-
strumental Variables Estimate When  Depends on D
For any two values of p, say p1 and p2, generated by two dierent values of Z, where p2 > p1,
S(p2)   S(p1) = E(Y1   Y0 j p1  UD  p2)Pr(p1  UD  p2)
= E(Y1   Y0 j p1  UD  p2)(p2   p1);
where the last expression follows from the fact that Pr(p1  UD  p2) = p2   p1. Thus,














Thus LATE is the chord of the gross surplus function over the interval [p1;p2]. The model-generated
LATE approximates MTE(uD) over an interval. By the mean value theorem, LATE(p2;p1) =
MTE(uD(p2;p1)) where uD(p2;p1) is a point of evaluation and uD(p2;p1) 2 [p1;p2]. The model-
28generated LATE can be identied if there are values of Z , say ~ z and ~ ~ z, such that Pr(D = 1 j Z =




If we partition the support of uD into M discrete and exhaustive intervals
[uD;0;uD;1);[uD;1;uD;2);:::;[uD;M 1;uD;M];
where uD;0 = 0 and uD;M = 1, we can dene




where j = uD;j   uD;j 1. Thus




which is the counterpart to expression (15) when p = 1. It shows how mean income can be
represented as a sum of incremental gross surpluses above E(Y0).
These expressions are derived from an underlying theoretical model. Whether or not the compo-
nents can be identied from the data depends on the support of Pr(D = 1 j Z). If Pr(D = 1 j Z = z)
assumes values at only a discrete set of support points, say p1 < p2 <  < pL, we can only identify
LATE in intervals with boundaries dened by uD;` = p`; ` = 1;:::;L.
MTE(uD) and the model-generated LATE (10) are structural parameters in the sense that
changes in Z (conditional on X) do not aect MTE(uD) or theoretical LATE. They are invariant
with respect to all policy changes that operate through Z. Conditional on X, one can transport
MTE and the derived theoretical LATEs across dierent policy environments and dierent data
sets. These policy invariant parameters implement Marschak's Maxim since they are dened for
combinations of the parameters of the generalized Roy model. Instead of separately estimating
the components of the selection model presented in Section 2.6, one can identify an interpretable
marginal gross benet function by using the derivative of E(Y j P(Z) = p).
29This deeper understanding of LATE facilitates its use in answering out-of-sample policy question
P3 for policies that operate through changing Z. Thus if one computes a LATE for any two pairs
of values Z = z1, and Z = z2, with associated probabilities Pr(D = 1 j Z = z1) = P(z1) = p1 and
Pr(D = 1 j Z = z2) = P(z2) = p2, one can use it to evaluate any other pair of policies ~ z and ~ ~ z such
that
Pr(D = 1 j Z = z1) = Pr(D = 1 j Z = ~ z) = p1
and
Pr(D = 1 j Z = z2) = Pr(D = 1 j Z = ~ ~ z) = p2:
Thus, one can use an empirical LATE determined for one set of instrument congurations to identify
outcomes for other sets of instrument congurations that produce the same p1 and p2, i.e., one can
compare any policy described by ~ z 2 fz j P(z) = p1g with any policy ~ ~ z 2 fz j P(z) = p2g and
not just the policies associated with z1 and z2 that identify the sample LATE. This is a powerful
result and enables analysts to solve policy evaluation question P3 to evaluate new policies never
previously implemented if they can be cast in terms of variations in P(Z) over the empirical support
on Z.56
Variation in dierent components of Z produce variation in P(Z). Analysts can aggregate the
variation in dierent components of Z into the induced variation in P(Z) to trace out MTE(uD)
over more of the support of uD than would be possible using variation in any particular component
of Z. The structural approach enables analysts to determine what stretches of the MTE dierent
instruments identify and to determine the margin of UD identied by the variation in an instrument.
Figure 2 reproduces the MTE displayed in Figure 1(b) on a dierent scale. Consider values
56We only require Y observations for each value of P(Z) = p for each p in the target population, not values of Y for
all Z. Assuming data on (Y;D;Z) triples, a completely nonparametric approach to identifying P(Z) would require
that all LATEs required to answer P3 would already be identied in the sample used to address P1 and identify
P(Z), i.e., there is no distinction between P1 and P3. However, one can imagine cases where the analyst has access
to a richer set of data on (D;Z) where data on Y are not available. Using the index suciency property, analysts
can determine E(Y j Z = z
) = E(Y j P(Z) = P(z
)), even if no Y is observed for a Z = z
, so long as there is some
value of Z = z
 in the sample such that P(z
) = P(z
). Moreover, if one adopts a parametric functional form for
P(Z), one can answer a much wider range of P3 questions. The same is true if a nonparametric P(Z) is available
from another sample. Structural invariance would justify combination of information across samples.
30Figure 2: MTE as a function of uD: What sections of the MTE dierent values of the instruments
and dierent instruments approximate.
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of instruments that are associated with P(z) = p2 and P(z) = p1 They identify the MTE at a
value of uD in the interval uD 2 [p1;p2], as depicted in the graph. This is LATE(p2;p1). If there is
continuous variation in Z it could be used to trace out the entire interval of MTE for P(Z) 2 [p1;p2],
using LIV. Independent of any instrument, we can dene the LATE and MTE using the underlying
economic model. In this fashion, we separate the task of denition of parameters from the task of
identifying them.
Instruments associated with higher values of P(Z), [p3;p4], identify the LATE in a dierent
stretch of the MTE associated with higher values of uD. Thus dierent instruments can identify
dierent parameters. Continuous instruments can identify entire stretches of the MTE while dis-
crete instruments dene the MTE at discrete points of the support (i.e., the LATE associated with
the interval dened by the values assumed by P(Z)). As a consequence of Vytlacil's Theorem, one
can identify the intervals of uD implicit in using LATEs formed using dierent instruments.
If the MTE does not depend on uD, E(Y j P(Z) = p) = E(Y0)+(1 0)p, and all instruments
identify the same parameter:   = 1   0. In this case, MTE is a at line parallel to the uD axis.
This is the case traditionally assumed in the analysis of instrumental variables.
A test of whether MTE(uD) depends on uD, or a test of nonlinearity of E(Y j P(Z) = p)
31in p, is a test of the whether dierent instruments estimate the same parameter.57 The LATE
model and its extensions overturn the logic of the Durbin (1954){Wu (1973){Hausman (1978)
test for overidentication. Variability among the estimates from IV estimators based on dierent
instruments may have nothing to do with the validity of any particular instrument, but may just
depend on what stretch of the MTE they approximate.
3.3 All Treatment Eects Are Weighted Averages of the MTE
Using the economics implicit in LATE unies and interprets the literature on treatment eects. All
of the conventional treatment eects featured in the program evaluation literature can be written
as weighted averages of the MTE or the structural LATEs where the weights can be estimated from

















where uD;j > uD;j 1 > uD;j 2 > . By the mean value theorem,58 we may express each of the








57See Heckman, Schmierer, and Urzua (2010) for a formal development of these tests and some Monte Carlo
evidence on their performance.

























j;j 1)(uD;j   uD;j 1). In the special case of ATE, he(u





where j = uD;j   uD;j 1.
The Policy Relevant Treatment Eect (PRTE), dened in Section 2, is
E(Y j Alternative Policy a)   E(Y j Baseline Policy b)





where hPRTE(uD) = Fb
P(uD) Fa
P(uD), and Fb
P is the distribution of P(Z) under policy b, and Fa
P
is the distribution of P(Z) under policy a.59 Using the mean value theorem, one can generate a
counterpart expression in terms of LATEs.
The PRTE weights MTE(uD) by the change in the distribution of the probabilities of partici-
59Assuming policy invariance as dened in subsection 2.3,
E (Y ) =
Z 1
0
















1 if 0  uD  t
0 otherwise.
33pation at dierent values of uD.60 Thus for a typical MTE as graphed in Figure 1(a), if a policy
shifts the distribution of participants toward low uD values, it generates a positive PRTE, since
MTE(uD) is higher for low uD values than it is for high uD values.
Notice that the same MTE(uD) can be used to evaluate the impacts of a variety of dierent
policies. MTE(uD) is a structural function since it is invariant across policies that aect the
distribution of the P(Z) but not the distribution of the potential ex post outcomes. We can evaluate
the eect of new policies never previously experienced if we can characterize the distributions of
P(Z) for those policies.
Table 3 displays the weights of the MTE that produce the traditional treatment parameters. All
of the weights can be estimated from the distribution P(Z).61 There are corresponding expressions
for the case of discrete support for P(Z) that can be obtained using the mean value theorem.
The weights integrate to 1. When  is independent of D, MTE(uD) does not depend on uD
(= 1   0 =  ), so all treatment parameters equal  .
Figure 3 plots an MTE taken from the analysis of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and the weights
for MTE associated with ATE, TT, and TUT for a case where  is not independent of D. ATE
weights uD evenly. TT oversamples low values of uD (associated with persons more likely to
participate in the program). TUT oversamples high uD. In this example, because MTE(uD) is
decreasing in uD, TT > ATE > TUT.
3.4 What Does Conventional IV estimate?
In most empirical studies, more than the two values of Z are used to construct IV estimates. For
this case, Imbens and Angrist (1994) use weights developed by Yitzhaki (1989) to express IV as a












[(1   FP(uD))E(Y1 j UD = uD) + FP(uD)E(Y0 j UD = uD)] duD:
Comparing policy a to policy b, E (Y











P(uD))duD. An alternative proof is given in Appendix A.
60The PRTE can be interpreted as an economically more explicit version of Stock's (1989) nonparametric policy
analysis parameter for a class of policy interventions with explicit agent preferences where the policies evaluated
operate solely on agent choice sets.
61I discuss the relationship between MTE and IV in the next subsection. For the general case, knowledge of the
joint distribution of Z, P(Z) is required.
34Table 3: MTE Weights For Dierent Treatment Parameter and IVs. (Fp is the distribution of P.


































































(j   E(J))fJ;P(j;p)dj dp
Cov(J;P) for a general instrument J(Z), a function of Z
fJ;P(j;p) is the joint density of J and P. For derivations of these weights, see Heckman
and Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007b).
Figure 3: MTE and the weights for the marginal treatment eect for dierent parameters for the
model graphed in Figure 1



















Source: Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
35weighted average of component LATEs dened for dierent values of the instruments. The weights
used by Imbens-Angrist are positive for each component LATE for the special instrument they
consider (P(Z) or some monotonic function of P(Z)). Since MTE(uD) may change sign over the
interval uD 2 [0;1], the IV may be negative even if some portion of the MTE(uD) is positive.
For general instruments that are not monotonic functions of P(Z), the output of IV is even more
ambiguous. The IV weights can be negative over regions of uD 2 [0;1]. Thus an IV based on
general instruments may have a sign opposite to the true causal eect as dened by the MTE.
Even if each component of LATE is positive, in the general case IV can be negative. Negative
components of MTE(uD) weighted by negative weights can generate a positive IV.
This analysis is constructive because the weights can be identied from the data. Analysts can
ascertain whether or not the weights are negative and over what regions of uD. In this subsection I
analyze the case where P(Z) is the instrument and the weights are positive. I analyze the general
case in section 3.6 below.
To understand what IV identies, consider a linear regression approximation of E (Y j P(Z) = p):









b is the same as the IV estimate of \the eect" of D on Y using P(Z) as an instrument since
Cov(P(Z);D) = Var(P(Z)).63

















Note that when MTE(uD) is constant in uD (MTE(uD) = 1 0 =  ) so that  is independent
62E
(M j N) denotes linear projection, i.e., the linear regression of M on N.


















=   Var(P(Z))
so b = 1   0 =  . This is the traditional result for IV. In this case, the marginal surplus is the
same as the average surplus for all values of p. Expression (19) arises because D depends on 
(=Y1 Y0), something assumed away in traditional applications of IV. As a consequence, in general,
the marginal surplus is not the average surplus.









Reversing the order of the integration of the terms on the right-hand side and respecting the




























An alternative expression for the weight is as the mean of left truncated P(Z):
hIV
P(Z)(uD) =
E(P(Z)   E(P(Z)) j P(Z) > uD)Pr(P(Z) > uD)
Var(P(Z))
which shows that the weight on the MTE(uD) is non-negative for all uD.
65This result is due to Yitzhaki (1989) and is elaborated in Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and Heckman
and Vytlacil (2007a). The Yitzhaki paper is posted at the website for Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006).
65Under the conditions of Fubini's theorem, it is valid to reverse the order of the integration. See the discussion in
the preliminary remarks of Appendix A.
37Figure 4: The MTE and IV weights as a function of uD.



















Source: Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).
The weights can be estimated from the sample distribution of P(Z). The weights for P(Z) as
an instrument have a distinctive prole. It is readily veried that they are non-negative, reach a
peak at the mean of the distribution of P(Z), and are zero at the extremes uD = 0 and uD = 1. The
weights integrate to 1.66 Figure 4 plots the IV weights and the MTE from a study by Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005). Comparing the IV weights with the weights for dierent treatment eects enables
analysts to determine how closely IV approximates any particular mean treatment eect.









(pt   E(P))fP(pt) and fP(pt) is the probability that P(Z) = pt. For a









383.5 The Problem of Limited Support
Before turning to the analysis of general instruments, I consider the problem of limited support for
P(Z) for the special instrument P(Z) used by Imbens and Angrist. Analysis of this simple case
establishes principles that apply to more general instruments. While the various treatment param-
eters can be dened from the generalized Roy model, they may not necessarily be identied from
the data. Both the nonparametric structural approach and the nonparametric program evaluation
approach avoid the problem of extrapolating estimates outside the support of the data.67 The early
literature in structural econometrics imposed strong functional forms (typically linearity) to obtain
estimates.68 P(Z) may not be identied over the full unit interval. Thus the lowest sample value
of P(Z) may exceed zero and the largest value of P(Z) may be less than 1.
In addition, P(Z) may only assume discrete values. This limits the identiability of MTE. In
this case, only LATE over intervals of uD 2 [0;1] can be identied from the values of P(Z) = P(z)
associated with the discrete instruments.69
One approach to this problem developed by Manski (1990, 1995, 2003) is to produce bounds on
the treatment eects. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001a,b, 2007b) develop specic bounds
for the generalized Roy model that underlies the LATE model. The bounds developed in the
literature are for conventional treatment eects and not for policy eects.
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010) consider an alternative approach based on marginal
policy changes. Many proposed policy changes are incremental in nature, and a marginal version of
the PRTE is all that is required to answer questions of economic interest. When some instruments
are continuous, it is possible under the conditions in their paper to identify a marginal version of
PRTE (MPRTE). MPRTE is in the form of representation (18) where the weights can be identied
from the data and the support requirements are more limited than the conditions required to identify
PRTE for large changes in policies. Their paper presents a derivation of the weights for classes of
policy expansions.70 Application of these data sensitive nonparametric approaches enables analysts
to avoid one source of instability of the estimates of policy eects that plagued 1980s econometrics.
67Angrist and Pischke (2010) are exceptions. They advocate use of linear equations in estimating treatment eects.
68As did the program evaluation literature. See Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1980).
69Bounds for MTE and LATE in the case of limited support are presented in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a,b,
2007b). Manski (1990, 1995, 2003) presents bounds for a wide array of models.
70Ichimura and Taber (2002) develop an alternative local approach that does not exploit the structure of the
generalized Roy model that underlies LATE.
393.6 More General Instruments
Typically, economists use a variety of instruments one at a time and not just P(Z) or some function
of P(Z), or some function of P(Z), as an instrument and compare the resulting estimates (see,
e.g, Card, 1999, 2001). When there is selection on the basis of gross gains ( ?  ? D) so that the
marginal gross surplus is not the same as the average gross surplus, dierent instruments identify
dierent parameters. IV is a weighted average of MTEs where the weights integrate to 1 and can
be estimated from sample data. However, in the case of general instruments, the weights can be
negative over stretches of uD.
Consider using the rst component of Z, Z1, as an instrument for D in equation (7). Suppose
that Z contains two or more elements (Z = (Z1;:::;ZK);K  2). The economics implicit in LATE
informs us that Z determines the distribution of Y through P(Z). Any correlation between Y and
Z1 arises from the statistical dependence between Z1 and P(Z) operating to determine Y .








Note, however, that choices (and hence Y ) are generated by the full vector of Z operating through
P(Z). The analyst may only use Z1 as an instrument but the underlying economic model informs
us that the full vector of Z determines observed Y . Conditioning only on Z1 leaves uncontrolled
the inuence of the other elements of Z on Y . This is a new phenomenon in IV that would not be
present if D did not depend on (= Y1  Y0). An IV based on Z1 identies an eect of Z1 on Y as
it operates directly through Z1 (Z1 changing P(Z1;:::;ZK)) holding other elements in Z constant
and indirectly through the eect of Z1 as it covaries with (Z2;:::;ZK), and how those variables
aect Y through their eect on P(Z).
A linear regression analogy helps to x ideas. Suppose that outcome Q can be expressed as a





where E(" j W) = 0. If we regress Q only on W1, we obtain in the limit the standard omitted










where 1 is the ceteris paribus direct eect of W1 on Q and the summation captures the rest of the
eect (the eect on Q of W1 operating through covariation between W1 and the other values W`,
` 6= 1). An analogous problem arises in using one instrument at a time to identify \the eect" of
Z1.
Thus if the analyst does not condition on the other elements of Z in using Z1 as an instrument,
the margin identied by variations of Z1 does not in general correspond to variations arising solely
from variations in Z1, holding the other instruments constant. The margin of choice implicitly
dened by the variation in Z1 is dicult to interpret and depends on the parameters of the gener-
alized Roy model generating outcomes as well as on the sample dependence between instrument Z1
and P(Z). Thus an IV based on Z1 mixes causal eects with sample dependence eects among the
correlated regressors.71 In a study of college going, if Z1 and Z2 are tuition and distance to college,
respectively, the instrument Z1 identies the direct eect of variation in tuition on college atten-
dance and the eect of distance to college on college attendance as distance covaries with tuition
in the sample used by the analyst. This is not the ceteris paribus eect of a variation in tuition.
It does not correspond to the answer needed to predict the eects of a policy that operates solely
through an eect on tuition. In models in which D depends on , the traditional instrumental vari-
able argument that analysts do not need a model for D and can ignore other possible determinants
of D other than the instrument being used, breaks down. To interpret which margin is identied
by dierent instruments requires that the analyst specify and account for all of the Z that form
P(Z). Since dierent economists may disagree on the contents of Z, dierent economists using Z1
on the same data will obtain the same point estimate but may disagree about the interpretation of
the margin identied by variation in Z1.
To establish these points, note that as a consequence of Vytlacil's theorem, Z enters the dis-
tribution of Y only through P(Z). Thus the conditional distribution of Y given Z1 = z1 operates
71Relationships that combine sample and structural relationships were called \mongrel" relationships by the early
structural econometricians (see Klein (1953)).
41through the eect of Z1 as it aects P(Z). That is a key insight from Vytlacil's theorem. Thus
E(Y j Z1 = z1) =
Z 1
0
E(Y j P(Z) = p)gP(Z)jZ1(p;z1)dp
where gP(Z)jZ1(p;z1) is the conditional density of P(Z) given Z1 = z1.72 Putting all of these
ingredients together, and using (15), we obtain






































This expression integrates the argument in the numerator with respect to uD, p, and z1 in that





















42The weight integrates to 1 but can be negative over stretches of uD.73 At the extremes (uD = 0;1),
the weights are zero.
An illuminating way to represent this weight is
hIV
Z1 (uD) =
E(Z1   E(Z1) j P(Z) > uD)Pr(P(Z) > uD)
Cov(Z1;D)
:
As uD is increased, the censored (by the condition P(Z) > uD) mean of (Z1   E(Z1)) may switch
sign, and hence the weights may be negative over certain ranges. Thus the IV estimator may have
a sign opposite to the true causal eect (dened by the MTE).
Figure 6 illustrates this possibility for the distribution of the data Z = (Z1;Z2) shown in
Figure 5, where Z is continuously distributed. The support of the data only permits identication
of P(Z) over the interval [0:1;0:9]. Thus none of the conventional treatment parameters is identied.
From LIV, we can identify the MTE over the interval [0:1;0:9]. We can also identify the weights
over this interval. For values of uD > 0:65, the weights are negative in this example. Thus it is
possible that the IV based on Z1 can be negative even if the MTE is everywhere positive. Table 4,
taken from Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) shows how three dierent distributions of Z for
the same underlying policy-invariant model with the same ATE can produce very dierent IV
estimates.
Table 4: IV estimator for three dierent distributions of Z but the same generalized Roy model.




Source: Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, Table 3).
73Cov(Z1;Y )
= E [(Z1   E(Z1))1(UD < P(Z))(Y1   Y0)] = E [(Z1   E(Z1))1(UD < P(Z))E(Y1   Y0 j Z;UD)]








MTE(uD)E (Z1   E(Z1) j P(Z)  uD)Pr(P(Z)  uD) duD:
The expression for Cov(Z1;D) is Cov(Z1;D) = E [(Z1   E(Z1))1(UD < P(Z))]: The expression for the weight for




Cov(Z1;Pr(P(Z)>UD)) so it is easy to see that the weights integrate to 1.




















This analysis elucidates the benets and limitations of the method of randomized controlled
experiments. Experiments that manipulate Z1 independently of other components of Z isolate
the eects of Z1 on outcomes in comparison with the eects obtained by sample variation in Z1
correlated with other components of Z. Neither set of variations may identify the returns to
any given policy unless the experimentally induced variation corresponds exactly to the variation
induced by the policy. Economists can use experimental variation to identify the MTE. The features
of a proposed policy are described by its eects on the PRTE weights as it aects the distribution
of P(Z). Proceeding in this way, one can use experiments to address a range of questions beyond
the eects directly identied by the experiment.
Using the implicit economic theory underlying LATE, economists can do better than just report
an IV estimate. We can be data sensitive but not at the mercy of the data. We can determine the
MTE (or LATEs) over the identied regions of uD in the empirical support of P(Z). We can also
determine the weights over the empirical support of P(Z) to determine whether they are negative
or positive. We can bound estimates of the unidentied parameters. (See Heckman and Vytlacil,
1999, 2001a,b, 2007b.) We can construct the eects of policy changes for new policies that stay
44Figure 6: MTE and IV weights for a general instrument Z1, a component of Z = (Z1;Z2).























within the support of P(Z) (see Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2010).
3.7 Policy Eects, Treatment Eects, and IV
A main lesson of this paper is that policy eects are not generally the same as treatment eects and,
in general, neither are produced from IV estimators. Since randomized assignments of components
of Z are instruments, this analysis also applies to the output of randomized experiments. The
economic approach to policy evaluation formulates policy questions using well-dened economic
models. It then uses whatever statistical tools it takes to answer those questions. Policy questions
and not statistical methods drive analyses. Well-posed economic models are scarce in the program
evaluation approach. Thus in contrast to the structural approach, it features statistical methods
over economic content. \Credibility" in the program evaluation literature is assessed by statistical
properties of estimators and not economic content or policy relevance.
We can do better than hoping that an instrument or an estimator answers policy problems.
By recovering economic primitives, we can distinguish the objects various estimators identify from
the objects needed to address policy problems and can address those problems. Constructing the
PRTE is an example of this approach.74
74An alternative approach developed in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) constructs combinations of instruments using
sample data on Z that address specic policy questions.
45Figure 7: MTE and Weights for IV and MPRTE in the Carneiro-Heckman-Vytlacil (2009)
Analysis of the Wage Returns to College.

























Source: Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2009).
Notes: The scale of the y-axis is the scale of the MTE, not the scale of the weights, which are scaled to t
the picture. The IV is P(Z).
Figure 7, taken from an analysis of the returns to attending college by Carneiro, Heckman,
and Vytlacil (2009), plots the estimated weights for MTE from a marginal change in policy that
proportionally expands the probability of attending college for everyone. The gure also plots the
estimated MTE and the IV weight using P(Z) as an instrument. The IV weights and the policy
weights are very dierent. The policy weights oversample high values of uD compared to the IV
weights. Since the MTE is declining in uD, this translates into an IV estimate of .095 compared
to a marginal policy eect of .015.75 The IV estimate would suggest a substantial mean marginal
gross return. The true marginal policy eect is much lower. Since the MTE can be estimated (or
approximated) from the data and the policy weights constructed from the data, one can produce
more accurate policy forecasts using the economics of the model.
3.8 Multiple Choices
Imbens and Angrist analyze a two choice model. Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006, 2010) and
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) extend their analysis to an ordered choice model and to general
75These estimated eects are statistically signicantly dierent from each other (see Carneiro, Heckman, and
Vytlacil, 2009).
46unordered choice models.76
In the special case where the analyst seeks to estimate the mean return to those induced into a
choice state by a change in an instrument compared to their next best option, the LATE framework
remains useful (see Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006, 2010; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007b). If,
however, one is interested in identifying the mean returns to any pair of outcomes, unaided IV will
not do the job. Structural methods are required.
In general unordered choice models, agents attracted into a state by a change in an instrument
come from many origin states, so there are many margins of choice. Structural models can identify
the gains arising from choices at these separate margins. This is a dicult task for IV without
invoking structural assumptions. Structural models can also identify the fraction of persons induced
into a state coming from each origin state. IV alone cannot. See Heckman and Urzua (2010).
4 Conclusions
This paper compares the structural approach to empirical policy analysis with the program eval-
uation approach. It oers a third way to do policy analysis that combines the best features of
both approaches. This paper does not endorse or attack any particular statistical methodology.
Economists are fortunate to have a rich menu of estimation methods from which to choose.
This paper advocates placing the economic and policy questions being addressed front and
center. Economic theory helps to sharpen statements of policy questions. Modern advances in
statistics can make the theory useful in addressing these questions. A better approach is to use the
economics to frame the questions and the statistics to help address them.
Both the program evaluation approach and the structural approach have desirable features.
Program evaluation approaches are generally computationally simpler than structural approaches,
and it is often easier to conduct sensitivity and replication analyses with them. Identication of
program eects is often more transparent than identication of structural parameters. At the same
time, the economic questions answered and the policy relevance of the treatment eects featured
in the program evaluation approach are often very unclear. Structural approaches produce more
76Angrist and Imbens (1995) propose an ordered choice version of their 1994 paper. As shown by Heckman, Urzua,
and Vytlacil (2006) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b), their proposed extension has some unsatisfactory features
which can be removed by using an extension of the generalized Roy model to an ordered choice model using the
choice framework of Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) and Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003).
47interpretable parameters that are better suited to conduct counterfactual policy analyses.
The third way advocated in this essay is to use Marschak's Maxim to identify the policy relevant
combinations of structural parameters that answer well-posed policy and economic questions. This
approach often simplies the burden of computation, facilitates replication and sensitivity analyses,
and makes identication more transparent. At the same time, application of this approach forces
analysts to clearly state the goals of the policy analysis | something many economists (structural
or program evaluation) have diculty doing. That discipline is an added bonus of this approach.
I have illustrated this approach by using the economics implicit in LATE to interpret the margins
of choice identied by instrument variation and to extend the range of questions LATE can answer.
This analysis is a prototype of the value of a closer integration of theory and robust statistical
methods to evaluate public policy.
48Appendices
A Derivation of the Weights for PRTE
Preliminary Remarks: Recall that, if for two random variables J and K for 0  j  1 and
0  k  1, with density fJ;K(j;k)
Z Z
jfJ;K(j;k)jdj dk < 1;











Derivation: We can write
E(Y j Baseline b) =
1 Z
0
E(Y j P(Z) = p)fb
P(p)dp
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E(Y0 j UD = uD)duDfb
P(p)dp:
49Interchanging the limits of each integral
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E(Y1   Y0 j UD = uD)(Fb
P(uD)   Fa
P(uD))duD:
B IV For Discrete Instruments
Suppose that the support of the distribution of P(Z) contains a nite number of values p1 <
p2 <  < pK. The support of the instrument Z1 is also discrete, taking I distinct values.
E(Z1jP(Z) > uD) is constant in uD for uD within any (p`;p`+1) interval, and Pr(P(Z) > uD) is
constant in uD for uD within any (p`;p`+1) interval. Let ` denote the weight on the LATE for the
interval (p`;p`+1).
Under monotonicity condition (IA-3),
IVZ1 =
Z

















1 be the ith smallest value of the support of Z1:
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